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The bystander and the bin lorry: Weddle v Glasgow 
City Council considered 
Eleanor J Russell 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
The author considers the recent decision in Weddle v Glasgow 
City Council [2019] SC EDIN 42. The case arose out of the tragic 
events in central Glasgow on 22 December 2014 when a bin lorry 
ran out of control, resulting in several fatalities. The pursuer, who 
had been in the vicinity at the time, raised an action in which she 
sought damages in respect of psychiatric injury from the employer 
of the bin lorry driver. That action would ultimately fail owing to the 
pursuer’s inability to demonstrate that she was a primary victim. 
This article seeks to review the relevant law on psychiatric injury 
and to examine the court’s reasoning in Weddle. 
Introduction 
At one time, the law did not recognise claims for “pure” mental 
harm (i.e. mental harm unaccompanied by any actual physical 
injury) -see Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas (1888) 
13 App.Cas. 222. It is clear, however, that in the modern law of 
delict, the infliction of pure mental harm may constitute an 
actionable wrong-see Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669. 
Such cases may however involve “elements of greater subtlety 
than in the case of an ordinary physical injury, and these elements 
may give rise to debate as to the precise scope of legal liability” 
(per Lord Macmillan in Bourhill v Young 1942 S.C. (HL) 78 at 
p.87). Indeed, cases involving mental harm or psychiatric injury are 
tightly controlled by the courts for policy reasons. The courts are 
fearful of the floodgates opening and indeterminate liability arising, 
a fear given voice by Cardozo C.J. in Ultramares Corporation v 
Touche (1931) 255 N.Y. 170 at p.179 where he warned of "liability 
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class." 
The issue of legal liability in respect of psychiatric injury was the 
focus of attention in the All-Scotland Sheriff Personal Injury Court 
in the recent case of Weddle v Glasgow City Council [2019] SC 
EDIN 42. Before examining that case in detail, however, it is 




In this area of law, older authorities often employed the 
terminology of “nervous shock.” The modern authorities, however, 
tend to favour the terminology of “psychiatric injury.” Both of these 
labels are used interchangeably with the term “mental harm” in this 
article.  
 The first hurdle-a recognisable psychiatric injury 
A pursuer seeking damages for nervous shock or mental harm 
must demonstrate that he or she is suffering from a recognisable 
psychiatric injury. In McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410, Lord 
Bridge of Harwich stated the position as follows (at p.431):  
“the first hurdle which a plaintiff claiming damages of the kind 
in question must surmount is to establish that he is suffering, 
not merely grief, distress or any other normal emotion, but a 
positive psychiatric illness.”  
Crossing this hurdle would not be an impediment for the pursuer in 
Weddle (as will be seen below) as it was not in dispute that she 
was suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. 
The psychiatric injury must be induced by shock 
The psychiatric injury of which the pursuer complains must be 
induced by shock, namely “the sudden appreciation by sight or 
sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind” (per 
Lord Ackner in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
[1992] 1 A.C. 310 at p.401). Psychiatric illness resulting from more 
gradual assaults on the nervous system (e.g. such as the stress 
and strain of caring for a spouse who has been wrongfully injured) 
will not found an action.  
Primary and Secondary Victims-the distinction 
In the context of psychiatric injury, the distinction between primary 
and secondary victims is crucial. In one of the leading modern 
authorities on nervous shock, Alcock v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C. 310, Lord Oliver (at p.407) said: 
“Broadly [the cases] divide into two categories, that is to say, those 
cases in which the injured plaintiff was involved, either mediately 
or immediately, as a participant, and those in which the plaintiff 
was no more than the passive and unwilling witness of injury 
caused to others.” 
Pursuers or claimants in the first category of cases are known as 
primary victims whereas those in the second category are known 
as secondary victims. Accordingly, “the classification of all nervous 
shock cases under the same head may be misleading” (per Lord 
Lloyd in Page v Smith [1996] A.C. 155 at p.184). It would be wrong 
to assume that, owing to the “similarity of the medium through 
which the injury is sustained-that of an assault upon the nervous 
system,” a single common test applies to the duty of care enquiry, 
a point stressed by Lord Oliver in Alcock (at p.407.) It is therefore 
essential to determine whether the pursuer is a primary or 
secondary victim as the categorization of the victim will determine 
the appropriate test to be applied to the duty of care analysis. 
Primary Victims  
Primary victims include those who have been personally involved 
in the accident out of which the action arises. This will include 
those who have been personally threatened with bodily injury. In 
Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669, the plaintiff’s psychiatric 
injury resulted from fear for her own safety when a horse-drawn 
van was driven into the public house in which she was working. 
Also found within this category, according to Lord Oliver in Alcock, 
are those who come to the aid of others who have been injured or 
threatened. (See Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 
W.L.R. 912 where psychiatric illness was caused to an individual 
through the traumatic effects of coming to the aid of victims of the 
Lewisham railway disaster.) (It is worth noting, that, in that case, 
the railway carriage which the plaintiff had entered was at risk of 
collapse and so there was an element of personal danger to the 
plaintiff. In light of post Alcock developments the “personal danger” 
analysis would now be the preferred one.) The “primary victim” 
category also includes those who, through the negligence of 
others, have suffered shock by being put in the position of 
believing that they have been the involuntary cause of another’s 
death or injury. This was the case in Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co 
Ltd [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271. The plaintiff was operating a crane 
when its sling broke causing its load to plummet into the hold of a 
ship in which men were working. The plaintiff was therefore 
intimately involved in the accident (although he was not 
responsible for it). 
The leading modern authority on primary victims who suffer 
nervous shock is Page v Smith [1996] A.C. 155. There, while 
driving along the highway, the plaintiff was involved in a collision 
when a car, driven by the defendant, suddenly drove across his 
path. The plaintiff suffered no physical injury but claimed that, as a 
result of being involved in the accident, he suffered a 
recrudescence of chronic fatigue syndrome from which he had 
previously suffered, and which become chronic and permanent as 
a consequence of the accident. Lord Lloyd, who gave the leading 
speech, described the plaintiff as a primary victim because he was 
a participant. “He was himself directly involved in the accident, and 
well within the range of foreseeable physical injury” ([1996] A.C. 
155 at p.184). The House of Lords held that, in the case of a 
primary victim, foreseeability of physical injury alone was sufficient 
to enable recovery in respect of psychiatric injury. Lord Lloyd 
stated ([1996] A.C. 155 at p.190) that “[i]t was unnecessary to ask, 
as a separate question, whether the defendant should reasonably 
have foreseen injury by shock.” Moreover, it was irrelevant that the 
plaintiff did not suffer any external physical injury. 
As will be seen below, the pursuer in Weddle v Glasgow City 
Council was claiming to be a primary victim, although the court, 
following a careful review of the evidence, declined to categorise 
her as such.  
Secondary victims  
In Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 
A.C. 310, Lord Oliver stated (at pp.408-9): “In those cases in 
which…the injury complained of is attributable to the grief and 
distress of witnessing the misfortune of another person in an event 
by which the plaintiff is not personally threatened or in which he is 
not directly involved as an actor, the analysis becomes more 
complex.” Indeed, it will be seen that stringent control mechanisms 
are applied to such secondary victim cases in order to avoid 
virtually limitless liability. 
A convenient starting place for the discussion of secondary victims 
is the well known Scottish case of Bourhill v Young 1942 S.C. 
(H.L.) 78; 1943 S.L.T. 105. There, a speeding motorcyclist was 
killed following a collision with another vehicle. The pursuer, who 
had alighted from a nearby tramcar, heard the collision but did not 
see it. She was positioned on the far side of the tramcar, some 45-
50 feet from the point of impact. She later saw blood on the road. 
She sought damages for nervous shock from the executor of the 
deceased motorcyclist but the House of Lords held that the 
motorcyclist owed her no duty of care. Lord Russell of Killowen 
pointed out (at p.85) that “[t]he appellant was not in any way 
physically involved in the collision...The front part of the tramway-
car was between her and the colliding vehicles. She was 
frightened by the noise of the collision, but she had no reasonable 
fear of immediate bodily injury to herself.”  
Lord Porter observed (at p.98): 
“It is not every emotional disturbance or every shock which 
should have been foreseen. The driver of a car or vehicle, 
even though careless, is entitled to assume that the ordinary 
frequenter of the streets has sufficient fortitude to endure 
such incidents as may from time to time be expected to 
occur in them, including the noise of a collision and the sight 
of injury to others, and is not to be considered negligent 
towards one who does not possess the customary phlegm.” 
In Bourhill, as Lord Killowen observed, the pursuer was not herself 
in personal jeopardy. She was not a primary victim. She was, to 
borrow Lord Oliver’s words in Alcock, a “passive and unwilling 
witness of injury caused to others” (i.e. a secondary victim). Injury 
to her by shock was not reasonably foreseeable to the motorcyclist 
and, accordingly, Mrs Bourhill failed to recover.  
It is now clear, however, that in limited circumstances, a secondary 
victim suffering psychiatric injury may recover damages from the 
wrongdoer. McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410 was a 
significant milestone in the development of the law. There, the 
plaintiff's husband and three of her children were involved in a 
road traffic collision with a lorry. The plaintiff was at home two 
miles away at the time. A neighbour told her of the accident an 
hour or so later and took her to the hospital where she learned that 
her youngest child had been killed. She saw her injured husband 
and two injured children in a distressed state and still covered in 
mud, grime and oil. The plaintiff sought damages alleging that the 
impact of what she heard and saw caused her severe shock. In the 
House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce identified “the critical question” 
(at pp.417-8) as “whether…one who was not present at the scene 
of grievous injuries to her family but who comes upon those 
injuries at an interval of time and space, can recover damages for 
nervous shock.” On the facts in McLoughlin, that question was 
answered in the affirmative. The plaintiff was the wife and mother 
of the injured and deceased parties and had witnessed the 
immediate aftermath of the accident with her own eyes. Lord 
Wilberforce set out (at pp.422-3) the control mechanisms which 
applied to such claims (all of which were satisfied in the 
McLoughlin case): 
“It is necessary to consider three elements inherent in any 
claim: the class of persons whose claims should be 
recognised; the proximity of such persons to the accident; 
and the means by which the shock is caused. As regards the 
class of persons, the possible range is between the closest 
of family ties - of parent and child, or husband and wife - and 
the ordinary bystander. Existing law recognises the claims of 
the first: it denies that of the second…As regards proximity to 
the accident, it is obvious that this must be close in both time 
and space...Experience has shown that to insist on direct 
and immediate sight or hearing would be impractical and 
unjust and that under what may be called the "aftermath" 
doctrine one who, from close proximity, comes very soon 
upon the scene should not be excluded…Lastly, as regards 
communication, there is no case in which the law has 
compensated shock brought about by communication by a 
third party…The shock must come through sight or hearing 
of the event or of its immediate aftermath. Whether some 
equivalent of sight or hearing, e.g. through simultaneous 
television, would suffice may have to be considered.”  
 
The issue of simultaneous television broadcast would arise in the 
later case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
[1992] 1 A.C. 310. The case arose as a result of the Hillsborough 
tragedy in 1989. The South Yorkshire Police Force was 
responsible for crowd control at a football match at the 
Hillsborough stadium but allowed too many intending spectators 
into part of the ground. A crush ensued and 95 people were killed. 
Over 400 others were physically injured. The plaintiffs were not 
themselves directly involved in the accident but had various 
relationships to those in the area of the crush. In other words, the 
plaintiffs were secondary victims. They claimed damages for 
psychiatric illness. In none of the ten appeals to the House of 
Lords was the plaintiff successful. Their Lordships held that the 
tests of reasonable foreseeability and proximity must be satisfied 
before recovery could be permitted. It had to be reasonably 
foreseeable that a plaintiff would suffer psychiatric injury. This 
would only be the case where a close tie of love and affection 
existed between the plaintiff and the victim. Such a tie would be 
assumed in spousal and parent/child relationships, but would 
require proof in other cases.  
In addition to foreseeability, two additional factors for proximity 
required to be satisfied - (1) proximity in terms of time and space 
and (2) direct perception (i.e. sight or hearing) of the event or its 
immediate aftermath.  
As far as proximity in terms of time and space was concerned, 
identifying a dead brother-in-law eight hours after the accident 
could not be described as part of the immediate aftermath (see 
Lord Ackner, [1992] 1 A.C. 310 at p.405). 
As for the need for direct perception, viewing live television footage 
of events at Hillsborough could not be equiparated with the viewer 
being within "sight or hearing of the event or of its immediate 
aftermath". Significantly, the television scenes did not depict 
suffering of recognisable individuals, as that was prevented by the 
broadcasting code of ethics, a position known to the defendant. 
  
The litigation in Bourhill, McLoughlin and Alcock involved 
secondary victims of the various wrongdoers’ negligence. All of 
those secondary victims claimed to have suffered nervous shock. 
In such claims, the House of Lords has made clear that, in addition 
to reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury, there are onerous 
requirements of proximity which must be satisfied. While Mrs 
McLoughlin was able to overcome those hurdles, the appellants in 
Alcock were unable to do so. 
 
Weddle v Glasgow City Council 
Attention is now turned to the case of Weddle v Glasgow City 
Council [2019] SC EDIN 42. The facts of the case were as follows.  
The pursuer, Danielle Weddle, was a student at the University of 
Stirling. On 22 December 2014, she travelled by train from 
Edinburgh to Glasgow’s Queen Street Station. Upon exiting the 
station, she proceeded to the pedestrian crossing on West George 
Street. While waiting to cross, she was looking at her mobile 
phone. The Millennium Hotel was to her left. 
While she was standing there, a large bin lorry owned and 
operated by the defender and driven by its employee, Henry 
Clarke, mounted the west pavement of Queen Street and travelled 
along it striking a number of pedestrians, items and sign poles in 
its path. The bin lorry then rejoined the carriageway and continued 
to travel north on George Square. Near the junction of George 
Street and West George Street, the bin lorry struck several 
vehicles including a silver taxi which was stationary at the junction. 
The lorry then crossed the north carriageway of George Square 
pushing the silver taxi in front of it. Both vehicles were travelling at 
about 5 mph. The bin lorry mounted the north pavement and came 
to rest against the wall of the Millenium Hotel. Prior to the lorry‘s 
impact with the taxi, the pursuer was looking at her phone. The 
impact produced a loud bang, causing the pursuer to look up. At 
that point, the bin lorry was about 40m away from the pursuer. 
Both vehicles moved forward to a position about 32m away from 
her. The pursuer looked back at her phone and immediately back 
across towards the bin lorry and taxi. The bin lorry travelled 
roughly north east. The silver taxi travelled almost in a straight line 
from its starting position, smacked into a pillar and came to rest 
about 12m from where the pursuer was standing. At no stage was 
either the bin lorry or taxi coming directly towards the pursuer. At 
no stage was she at risk of being struck by either vehicle. The 
pursuer showed no physical reaction to what she had seen occur, 
a fact evident from the CCTV footage played in court. The pursuer 
saw the passenger and driver get out of the taxi. She thought it 
was simply a road accident and that everyone was unhurt. She 
proceeded on her way.  
As the pursuer made her way along George Street, she saw a 
black car which was scraped and a family hugging each other. She 
then saw a girl on the ground. She related none of this to what she 
had just seen. A man was trying to pick the girl up and the pursuer 
soon realised that the girl was dead. On Queen Street, the pursuer 
heard a man on the phone talking about “lots of dead people”. She 
then saw a second body – a girl. There was white matter on the 
ground which looked like intestines. The pursuer telephoned her 
father and tried to explain what had happened. Her father’s 
impression was that she was suffering extreme distress. She 
confirmed that she was physically unhurt but said “there has been 
a horrible accident”. Her mother then telephoned the pursuer and 
persuaded her to go to a pharmacy. The pharmacy assistant, Mrs 
Wade, noticed that the pursuer was crying and trembling and 
seemed unable to calm down. The pursuer told Mrs Wade that she 
had seen an accident and that a girl had been knocked down and 
she had been very close to it. Mrs Wade arranged for the pursuer 
to see a doctor from a local practice and she was given Diazepam. 
Following these events, the pursuer suffered nightmares and 
psychological symptoms including intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, 
anxiety and depression. She consulted her GP and was referred 
for counselling. She was diagnosed as suffering from post 
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Her condition resulted in 
disruption to her lifestyle and university studies. 
The pursuer sought damages for mental harm attributable to the 
incident described above. The case came before Sheriff McGowan 
for proof in the All-Scotland Sheriff Personal Injury Court. The 
defender, Glasgow City Council, admitted that the driver of the bin-
lorry had been negligent and that it was vicariously responsible for 
his actions. The council did not dispute that the pursuer had 
suffered mental harm in the form of a recognised psychological 
injury. The issue between the parties was whether the pursuer was 
a primary victim. While the pursuer submitted that she was a 
primary victim, that characterisation was vigorously resisted by the 
defender. 
Pursuer’s submissions 
The pursuer’s case in Weddle was that she was a primary victim. 
Reference was made to Campbell v North Lanarkshire Council and 
Another 2000 SCLR 373. There, Lord Reed, following a review of 
the authorities, had explained that, as far as primary victims were 
concerned, it was essential to identify the range of foreseeable 
physical injury and that “[f]oreseeable injury in this context appears 
to mean potential physical injury or reasonable apprehension of 
such injury” (at pp. 380-381). In Weddle, the pursuer’s position 
was that when she was waiting at the crossing and the accident 
unfolded before her eyes, she reasonably believed she was 
exposed to the danger of physical injury and reasonably believed 
she was in fear for her own safety. Her evidence at proof was that 
upon hearing the loud bang, she looked up to see the bin lorry 
travelling up Queen Street towards her. She felt as though it was 
coming directly towards her. She then saw it propel a taxi along in 
front of it and thought she was going to be struck.  
The difficulty with that evidence, however, was that during her 
counselling sessions, the pursuer did not mention that she had 
been in fear for her safety when she witnessed the collision 
between the bin lorry and the taxi. Moreover, in November 2017, 
when the pursuer was seen by Dr Morrison for the purposes of 
preparing a psychological report, she did not mention being in fear 
for her own safety. Nor, in 2018, when the pursuer was seen by Dr 
Jacqueline Scott, Consultant Psychiatrist, did she say to her that 
she had been in fear for her own safety when the collision 
occurred. In January 2019, Dr Morrison saw the pursuer again in 
order to prepare an up-to-date report. During that assessment, the 
pursuer told Dr Morrison that when she later considered the 
accident, she recalled being extremely worried that one of the 
vehicles would hit her and that she would be seriously injured or 
killed. When questioned as to why she had neglected to mention 
this in the first assessment, the pursuer stated that she was 
experiencing difficulties with guilt owing to the fact that she had 
survived the accident but had been unable to help the second girl. 
The defender’s submissions  
The defender submitted that, if it was not reasonably foreseeable 
by Clarke that the pursuer could be physically injured by his 
actions, the pursuer’s case must fail. The court should judge the 
immediate actions of Clarke, not the general build up. The 
immediate actions were that the bin lorry was driving in a direction 
away from the pursuer and not towards her. It was clear from the 
CCTV footage that no reasonable driver would think he was going 
to collide with the pursuer. The defender submitted that the 
perception of the pursuer herself was important here. If the pursuer 
was not herself actually terrified of physical injury, why should 
Clarke have been so cognisant? The defender submitted that the 
pursuer was not in fear for her own safety. The CCTV evidence 
disclosed that her actions were not indicative of someone in a 
state of terror. Other evidence pointed to the same conclusion: the 
pursuer did not mention fear to Dr Morrison at their first meeting; 
she failed to mention any such factor to her counsellors or GP; and 
when examined by Dr Scott, she did not mention being terrified to 
her. The defender submitted that the bin lorry driver would not 
have reasonably foreseen that his driving in the approach to the 
junction would have given rise to the risk of physical injury to the 
pursuer. Accordingly, the pursuer did not qualify as a primary 
victim and was not entitled to obtain damages for any psychiatric 
injury suffered by her.  
Judgment of the court 
 As far as his review of the evidence was concerned, Sheriff 
McGowan observed that the CCTV evidence indicated that neither 
the bin lorry nor the silver taxi was heading straight towards the 
pursuer. The bin lorry was moving away from her and the silver 
taxi was moving in more or less a straight line. Following the sound 
of the collision, the pursuer did not step back or show any other 
signs of agitation or fear. The pursuer’s trauma after witnessing the 
events in George Square was spoken to by her father and the 
pharmacy assistant, Mrs Wade. Both witnesses gave evidence of 
their impression that the pursuer was in a state of fear. However, 
Sheriff McGowan’s view was that the pursuer‘s report to her father 
was based on the aftermath of the accident and he concluded (at 
para.198) that “her emotional state was attributable to that, rather 
than the collision she had directly witnessed albeit allied with a 
realisation that both were linked; and that emotional state did not 
amount to fear of physical injury to herself arising at the time when 
she witnessed the collision.” As for Mrs Wade’s evidence, Sheriff 
McGowan found (at para.201) that it was “not reliable as to the 
pursuer’s precise emotional state at that time or the reason for it.” 
The pursuer was distressed and not reporting matters clearly. He 
stated (at para.202): “As with Mr Weddle, how was Mrs Wade to 
distinguish between fear and other strong emotional reactions, 
such as horror or shock?” 
As for the pursuer’s failure to mention fear in her first meeting with 
Dr Morrison and her attempted explanation therefor, Sheriff 
McGowan stated (at para.235): 
“[T]o accept that the pursuer suffered fear of physical injury to 
herself in response to seeing the collision between the bin lorry 
and the silver taxi would involve not simply adding that detail to her 
account, but would entail a complete re-framing of her entire 
account.”  
Sheriff McGowan did not find the pursuer’s explanation to be very 
clear about why she had not mentioned a feeling of terror to Dr 
Scott. He was unable to follow why feelings of guilt prevented her 
from mentioning other feelings such as fear. He concluded (at 
para.241): 
“In my view, the more likely explanation standing the other 
evidence in the case is that the pursuer has convinced herself 
looking back that she did experience fear for her physical safety 
when she saw the collision between the bin lorry and the silver taxi 
when in fact her reaction – which no doubt encompassed severe 
shock and anxiety – manifested itself only once she had witnessed 
the aftermath of the bin lorry’s progress north before it had come 
into her line of sight.”  
Dr Morrison, in his evidence, seemed to support the pursuer’s 
explanation for failing to mention fear at their first meeting. The 
question arose as to whether the pursuer’s explanation for fear not 
being mentioned during the first assessment was sufficient to 
undermine the weight to be accorded to the first account. In Sheriff 
McGowan’s view it was not. He stated (at paras.259-260):  
“First, I have already observed that the addition of fear or terror 
attributable to the bin lorry and silver taxi collision would involve 
not a simple addition to the first account recorded by Dr Morrison, 
but a complete re-writing of it. Second, Dr Morrison made 
important concessions under cross examination e.g. the original 
account was detailed; it could fairly be said to describe a delay in 
onset of an emotional reaction (distress) rather than an immediate 
one. Furthermore, the pursuer’s first account fits better with other 
evidence about accident circumstances, especially the CCTV 
footage.” 
The pursuer’s evidence in court about the accident circumstances 
was to the effect that she heard a big bang and looked up from her 
phone. She said that she felt really scared and did not know if the 
taxi or the bin lorry was going to hit her. However, Sheriff 
McGowan formed the following view (at para.297):  
“[A] combination of the CCTV footage and the terms of the agreed 
police report taken along with the pursuer’s evidence about 
distances demonstrates that the pursuer is in error in suggesting 
that either the bin lorry or the silver taxi was coming towards her or 
ever placed her in physical danger. “ 
As far as the applicable law was concerned, the parties were 
agreed that the question of whether someone could be categorised 
as a primary victim was summarised in Campbell. Senior counsel 
for the pursuer submitted that the pursuer could be regarded as a 
primary victim if she could show that either she (a) was objectively 
exposed to danger or (b) reasonably believed she was exposed to 
danger. Senior counsel for the defender did not seek to dispute 
that. He submitted however that the point in time at which the bin 
lorry driver’s actions should be judged was ‘the immediate 
circumstances’, i.e. when the pursuer was broadly in the vicinity of 
the bin lorry. Sheriff McGowan accepted the defender’s 
submission stating (at para.301): 
“The duty is owed to somebody who was placed in danger, or 
reasonably believed themselves to be so. In my view, that test 
could never be satisfied by somebody who was separated 
physically and temporally from the occurrence and effects of 
negligence. Put another way, the pursuer could only ever be a 
primary victim in relation to the negligence of Mr Clarke when the 
lorry was relatively near her.”  
It followed that the question of the extent of Clarke’s duty, if any, 
towards the pursuer had to be determined by reference to events 
as witnessed by the pursuer as she stood at the pedestrian 
crossing outside Queen Street Station.  
As far as duty of care was concerned, the first question to be 
answered was whether the pursuer was actually at risk of physical 
injury at the relevant time? This was a question of fact which fell to 
be determined by considering physical factors such as location, 
speed, distance and direction. It was clear from the CCTV footage 
that the pursuer only looked up when the bin lorry collided with the 
taxi. Beyond looking up and across, back down at her phone and 
then back across, she displayed no other physical response to 
what she saw. She did not step back, put her hand up to her face 
or react in any other way indicative of fear. Following his 
assessment of the evidence, Sheriff McGowan concluded (at 
paras.317-319): 
“[I]t is clear that neither the bin lorry nor the silver taxi were moving 
fast. They were not heading towards [the pursuer]: if anything, their 
trajectory was away from her. They did not come very close to her. 
On no view could this be regarded as a ‘near miss’. The point can 
perhaps best be evaluated by asking the hypothetical question: 
what would have happened if the physical barriers which the lorry 
and taxi struck, bringing them to a halt, had not been there? The 
answer is that they would have carried on into the distance past 
the pursuer, causing no injury or danger of same to her. 
Accordingly, the question as to whether the pursuer was at risk of 
physical injury at the relevant time must be answered in the 
negative.“ 
The next matter to be determined in terms of the duty of care 
analysis was whether the pursuer reasonably believed she was at 
risk of physical injury at the relevant time? Sheriff McGowan 
compared some cases which fell on either side of the line. In 
Hegarty v EE Caledonia Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 413 the plaintiff 
was employed as a painter on the ‘Piper Alpha’ oil platform which 
was owned and operated by the defendant. He was aboard a 
support vessel, the Tharos, on the night of certain explosions and 
fires on the Piper Alpha platform which resulted in many deaths. 
The support vessel moved close to the platform in an attempt to 
rescue survivors but retreated after a further explosion. There was 
no damage to the vessel and no one on board was physically 
injured. However, the plaintiff sued the defendant claiming that he 
was suffering from post-traumatic stress. It was held that at no 
time did the fire reach the vessel or cause any danger or damage 
to anybody or to the vessel itself. Although the plaintiff was 
genuinely in fear of his life and safety, that was not a reasonable 
fear. At no point was he ever closer to Piper Alpha than 100 
metres. He failed to recover damages. 
Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669, on the other hand, was a 
case where the plaintiff, although not actually being in danger, 
reasonably thought that she was owing to the sudden and 
unexpected nature of the event. She was therefore entitled in 
principle to damages for nervous shock, if she could prove her 
allegations at trial. 
Returning to Weddle’s case, the starting point was that the pursuer 
was not in fact in danger of physical injury. Sheriff McGowan 
summarised the position as follows (at para.333): 
“Neither the bin lorry nor the car was ever heading straight towards 
her. They did not come particularly close to her. The initial collision 
took place over 30m away (at least) from her. Thereafter, both 
vehicles were moving relatively slowly and came to rest at least 
12m away from her. There was no explosion, fire or other such 
risk... What she was aware of at that stage was of relatively small 
scale… It was a road accident involving a collision between two 
vehicles. At that stage, she did not see – and in my view was net 
yet aware of – any pedestrians being injured or worse. She saw 
people get out of the car, assumed they were okay and she left the 
vicinity. In my opinion, assuming that she did believe that she was 
in danger, I am not persuaded that that was a reasonable belief.”  
Sheriff McGowan held that no duty of care was owed to the 
pursuer as she had failed to prove that, at the relevant time, the 
bin lorry driver should have had her in contemplation as somebody 
who was at risk of injury.  
Sheriff McGowan proceeded to point out that if the pursuer could 
not show that she was in fact in fear for her physical safety at the 
relevant time, her case could not succeed. As that issue on its own 
was potentially determinative of the case, he proceeded to give his 
views on it. The sheriff’s findings were that at the relevant time, the 
pursuer did not see and was not aware of the earlier line of travel 
of or mayhem caused by the bin lorry. (The fact that, following the 
collision, the pursuer adopted her intended route south along 
George Square heading towards Queen Street reinforced the view 
that she was unaware of what had already happened.) Moreover, 
the collision took place a substantial distance from the pursuer, 
neither vehicle was ever “coming towards” her, the bin lorry and 
taxi were not moving very fast, they both came to a halt some 
distance from her and the pursuer showed no significant physical 
response to what she had seen. The accident circumstances and 
the pursuer’s immediate reaction taken with what she said (and 
omitted to say) to Dr Morrison at their first meeting and the 
absence of any report of fear to her counsellors or Dr Scott 
contradicted her later assertions concerning fear. Indeed, on her 
own account to Dr Morrison, the pursuer’s initial reaction was that 
the collision between the bin lorry and taxi was just a road 
accident. She suffered a realisation of growing horror as she 
moved along Queen Street. It was only as she pieced things 
together that she realised that something terrible had happened, 
probably involving the bin lorry. In the sheriff’s view, neither Mr 
Weddell nor Mrs Wade was in a position to properly distinguish 
between fear and other emotional reactions such as anxiety and 
shock. He concluded (at para.349): 
“Drawing all these threads together, I am satisfied that the pursuer 
did suffer PTSD – this was not in dispute. However, I am not 
satisfied that she was in fear of physical injury at the relevant time. 
If she did suffer fear at some stage, that was attributable to the 
horror of the aftermath of the incident and not to the terror of the 
accident involving the bin lorry and the silver taxi.”  
He added (at para.377): 
“In view of the conclusions I have reached, I make a finding in fact 
and law that the defender’s employee would not have reasonably 
foreseen that his driving at the relevant time would have given rise 
to the risk of physical injury to the pursuer; and in any event, that 
the pursuer did not in fact suffer fear of physical injury to herself at 
the relevant time; and that accordingly, the pursuer does not 
qualify as a primary victim and she cannot therefore obtain 
damages for any psychiatric injury suffered by her.” 
Sheriff McGowan granted decree of absolvitor.  
Concluding remarks 
 
The pursuer in Weddle undoubtedly encountered ghastly scenes in 
the centre of Glasgow on 22 December 2014 and the court was in 
no doubt that she had suffered psychiatric illness as a result. While 
the pursuer’s case evokes sympathy, one must remain mindful of 
Lord Wilberforce’s observations in McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 
A.C. 410 (at pp. 421-423) that “because 'shock' in its nature is 
capable of affecting so wide a range of people” there remains “a 
real need for the law to place some limitation upon the extent of 
admissible claims.” 
In Weddle, the pursuer’s claim was ultimately considered not to be 
admissible. She was of course seeking to establish that she was a 
primary victim but she did not come within a measurable distance 
of achieving that. The court did not consider that she was at risk of 
physical injury or feared for her own safety.  
It is interesting to note that the pursuer in Weddle presented no 
argument to the effect that recovery should be permitted as a 
secondary victim. As discussed above, a claim on the part of a 
secondary victim will only succeed in highly particular 
circumstances and presumably Ms Weddle’s advisers took the 
view that she would be unable to satisfy the control mechanisms 
set out in Alcock. There was nothing to suggest that she knew the 
primary victims of the accident, let alone that she had a close tie of 
love and affection with any of them. It is therefore perhaps 
unsurprising that she attempted to advance a case based on the 
contention that she, herself, was a primary victim. Yet, the decision 
in Weddle ultimately demonstrates that cases advanced on a 
“primary victim” basis are not without their own difficulties. Unless 
such pursuers can demonstrate that they feared for their own 
safety-that they were in effect within the range of physical danger- 
then, failing some other active involvement in the incident (such as 
in Dooley), they will not recover.   
 
 
